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Proprietary Remedies in Insolvency:  A 
Comparison of the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment with English 
and Commonwealth Law 
Anthony Duggan* 
Abstract 
This Article deals with proprietary remedies, in particular the 
constructive trust, and their application in the defendant’s bankruptcy.  The 
Article offers a comparative analysis of English and Commonwealth law 
with the relevant parts of the recently completed Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment.  The discussion is organized around five 
simple hypotheticals, each representing issues which courts in England and 
other parts of the Commonwealth have found particularly troubling:  
mistaken payments; misrepresentation in the context of land dealings; 
misrepresentation in other contexts; breach of fiduciary obligation; and 
specific performance.  The aim is to identify the likely outcome in each case 
under both American and English/Commonwealth law and to explore the 
policy implications of the differences that emerge. 
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I.  Introduction 
At its Annual Meeting in May 2010, the American Law Institute (ALI) 
approved the Restatement of the Law (Third) of Restitution & Unjust 
Enrichment in its final form.  The vote marked the end of a project that had 
run for more than ten years and that involved the progressive release and 
revision of seven tentative draft documents under the direction of Reporter, 
Professor Andrew Kull.  The Restatement covers every aspect of the law of 
restitution, drawing together a wide range of doctrines and principles and 
exploring the inter-face between restitution and other parts of private law, 
including contract, tort, property, and the law of fiduciary obligations.  To 
borrow ALI Director Lance Liebman’s words, we can see in the 
Restatement "a structure that holds together—as if this were natural and not 
manmade—an extraordinary variety of legal disputes and legal doctrines."1  
The Restatement traverses a host of "[fascinating] legal controversies" and 
it sends an important message about "the continued vitality of the common 
law as a vehicle for applying contemporary values to provocative 
disputes."2 
The Restatement also serves an important educational function because, 
as Kull himself has remarked, "[s]carcely anyone in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2008). 
 2. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).  
PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN INSOLVENCY 1231 
States understands what restitution is about . . . [m]ost law schools gave up 
teaching restitution a generation ago, and many judges and practitioners are not 
familiar with its general principles."3  This regrettable state of affairs has important 
implications for commercial law at large, and bankruptcy law in particular, 
because "[l]ack of familiarity with the restitutionary elements of the background 
[commercial law] rules results in a predictable distortion of commercial law."4  
Liebman predicts that "lawyers, judges and professors will use [the 
Restatement]."5  He seems to have a mainly United States audience in mind, but 
there is also much lawyers in other common law countries could learn from the 
Restatement.  It has become common for courts in England, Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand to look to one another’s case law for guidance, but reliance on 
United States law is much less common.  In the same connection, private law 
scholarship in Australia, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Canada, is markedly 
Anglo-centric in focus, and there is a tendency to overlook the wealth of United 
States case law and literature on nearly any given topic.  In the area of restitution 
and unjust enrichment, this blind spot is especially puzzling, given that the now 
global restitution movement originated in the United States with Seavy and 
Scott’s ground-breaking work on the first Restatement on restitution.6 
One of the many topics the Restatement covers is proprietary remedies 
for claims in restitution and their status in the defendant’s insolvency.7  This 
was one of the last parts of the project to be completed.  It spanned two 
tentative drafts—numbers 6 and 7—published on March 12, 2008 and March 
12, 2010, respectively.  Coincidentally, Richard Calnan, an English lawyer, 
happened to be writing a book on the same topic during this very period and 
Calnan’s work was published around the time of the ALI’s 2010 Annual 
Meeting.8  There is no reference to the Restatement in Calnan’s book and, 
likewise, the Restatement makes no reference to Calnan.  This may be some 
confirmation of the blind spot mentioned above, though to some extent it is 
probably also an accident of timing.  In any event, the appearance of 
Calnan’s book at around the same time the finishing touches were being put 
to the Restatement was the inspiration for this Article.  My 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy:  Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 266–67 (1998). 
 4. Id. at 267. 
 5. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2008). 
 6. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937).  
 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 54–61 
(2011) [hereinafter, RESTATEMENT] (addressing proprietary, not monetary, remedies). 
 8. RICHARD CALNAN, PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND INSOLVENCY (2010). 
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aim is to compare English and Commonwealth law on proprietary remedies, 
drawing substantially on Calnan’s account, with the American position, as 
found in the Restatement.  
The topic raises one of the most vexing questions in the law of 
obligations.  It involves the interplay between two fundamental principles 
of insolvency law:  (1) the pari passu sharing principle, which establishes 
that unsecured creditors are entitled to equal treatment in a debtor’s 
bankruptcy;9 and (2) what might be called the property of the estate 
principle, which holds that the property available for distribution among 
creditors is limited to the debtor’s own property at the date of the 
bankruptcy and does not include assets belonging to others.10  The 
application of these principles, in turn, depends on the distinction between 
personal and proprietary rights and the problem is that, in a common law 
system, this is not a straightforward exercise because equity blurs the 
boundaries.  So the positive challenge is to identify the factors which 
motivate courts of equity to recognize proprietary claims, while the 
normative challenge is to identify those cases in which it is appropriate, as a 
policy matter, to give the claimant a proprietary interest. 
The following discussion is organized around five simple 
hypotheticals, each representing fact patterns which courts in England and 
other parts of the Commonwealth have found particularly troubling.  My 
aim is to identify the likely outcome of each case under both American and 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. f (discussing U.S. law).  Calnan provides the 
following description of English law: 
The pari passu sharing principle is one of the main tenets of insolvency law, and 
has been so for centuries. The expression (which means, literally, ‘in equal 
steps’) establishes that, at least as the general rule, all creditors are equal. It is 
normally given in its Latin form, and is rarely translated into the vernacular. 
Perhaps this is because a reference to ‘equal’ sharing might be misleading. Each 
creditor is not entitled to an equal amount.  His entitlement is to be paid the 
same proportion of his debt as the other creditors.  If creditor A is owed 100, and 
creditor B is owed 50, equality of treatment will require A to receive twice as 
much as B.  It is perhaps this ambiguity in the meaning of ‘equality’ which has 
led us to retain the use of the Latin tag at a time when it is no longer fashionable 
to use them, even amongst lawyers. 
CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.10. 
 10. See RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note b (noting that in U.S. law "claims of 
creditors (whether voluntary or involuntary) must be satisfied from property of the debtor, 
not from property of someone else in the debtor’s possession").  For English law, see 
CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.62 ("[T]he pari passu sharing principle requires the assets of a 
debtor to be applied in discharge of his liabilities pari passu.  It is a fundamental element of 
this principle that it is the debtor’s assets which are to be used for this purpose, not those of 
other persons."). 
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English-Commonwealth law and to explore the policy implications of 
differences that may emerge.  The hypotheticals are grouped under five 
broad headings:  mistake (Part II, below); misrepresentation (1) (Part III); 
misrepresentation (2) (Part IV); wrongful gains (Part V); and specific 
performance (Part VI).  Part VII concludes. 
Part VI deserves a further word of explanation.  The Restatement does 
not discuss specific performance in any detail because, by definition, 
specific performance is not a restitutionary remedy.  However, specific 
performance is conceptually the mirror-image of rescission—in the sense 
that specific performance, by completing the contract, delivers to the 
claimant the asset he paid for while rescission, in unmaking the contract, 
restores to the claimant the value she parted with in the course of 
performance.11  Furthermore, the constructive trust remedy is commonly 
associated with both rescission claims and claims for specific performance 
and the Restatement does deal at length with the constructive trust.12  For 
these reasons, any discussion of proprietary remedies in insolvency would 
be incomplete without some reference to specific performance even if this 
involves straying beyond the limits of the restitution project.  
Incidentally, there is a salutary reminder here.  The restitution project 
is an exercise in what Stephen Waddams has called the "mapping of legal 
concepts," namely the schematic classification of private law into discrete 
subject areas—contract, tort, property, and so on—by reference to 
characteristics which unify some cases and distinguish others.13  Mapping 
serves an important organizational function; it assists our understanding of 
the law by dividing the overall mass into manageable chunks and, perhaps 
more importantly, by making connections that might otherwise have 
escaped our attention.  But, by the same token, as Waddams points out, 
mapping carries a degree of risk because, in any classification scheme, 
there is a tendency to treat the divisions as exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive.14  In real life, legal problems commonly traverse subject 
boundaries and, in such cases, too rigid a classification scheme may be an 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See RESTATEMENT § 54 cmt. e ("[W]hen rescission affords an alternative remedy 
for breach of a valid and enforceable contract . . . [it] permits the injured party to make a 
fundamental election, choosing to go backward (to the status quo ante) instead of forward 
(by enforcement of the contractual exchange).").  
 12. See id. § 55 (discussing constructive trusts). 
 13. STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:  CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING  (2003), Ch. 1, Introduction:  The Mapping of Legal 
Exclusion of Others. 
 14. See id. at 11 (noting the "question of whether it is necessary or desirable to think in 
terms of exhaustive and mutually exclusive divisions"). 
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obstacle to a comprehensive understanding of the issue.  To avoid this risk, 
we must constantly remind ourselves that the boundaries we draw are not 
fixed:  that, for example, a contract problem may also engage elements of 
tort law,15 or—returning  to the subject at hand—that a remedies question 
may traverse any given set of legal classifications (restitution, contracts, 
property, equity, bankruptcy law, and so on).  More specifically, while the 
constructive trust may be part of the law of restitution, it is not exclusively 
a restitutionary remedy, and it may serve a contract enforcement function as 
well.16 
II.  Mistake 
Case 1.  Bank A makes a transfer of $1 million to Bank B by mistake.  
Bank B goes into bankruptcy before Bank A can recover the money.  The 
payment is still identifiable in Bank B’s hands.   Can Bank A claim a 
constructive trust over the funds? 
A.  The Restatement 
Case 1 is based on Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank 
(London) Limited.17  Comparable American cases include Simms v. Vick18 
and Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach 
Employees of America, Division 998 v. Danielson.19  The answer to the 
question matters because if Bank A’s claim succeeds, it will recover 
payment of the disputed funds in full ahead of Bank B’s other unsecured 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See id. at 23–34 (showing connections between contract law and tort law).   
 16. See Robert Chambers, Constructive Trusts in Canada, 37 ALBERTA L. REV. 173, 
175–82 (1999) (discussing breach of duty and constructive trusts); see also RESTATEMENT 
§ 55 cmt. i ("In some circumstances, a decree that one party holds property in constructive 
trust for another will be similar if not identical in effect to a judgment granting specific 
performance of the recipient’s previous promise to the claimant."). 
 17. See Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank (London) Ltd. [1981] Ch. 
105, 128 (holding that the defendant had become a trustee over the mistaken payment made 
by plaintiff).  
 18. See Simms v. Vick, 65 S.E. 621, 621 (N.C. 1909) (holding that a mistaken 
payment, unlike a voluntary payment, could be recovered by the plaintiff). 
 19. See Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am., Div. 
998 v. Danielson, 128 N.W. 2d 9, 11-12 (Wis. 1964) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to 
restitution of mistaken payment to defendant less payment made by defendant relying on the 
honest belief that mistaken payment was hers).  
PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN INSOLVENCY 1235 
creditors.  If Bank A’s constructive trust claim fails, at best it will have a 
personal claim for recovery of the payment which will rank pari passu with 
other unsecured claims in Bank B’s bankruptcy.  The governing 
Restatement provisions are Sections 6, 55, and 60, which provide, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
§ 6. Payment Of Money Not Due 
Payment by mistake gives the payor a claim in restitution against the 
recipient. 
§ 55. Constructive Trust 
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to 
identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in violation of the 
claimant’s rights, the defendant may be declared a constructive trustee, 
for the benefit of the claimant, of the property in question and its 
traceable product. . . . 
§ 60. Priority 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by statute and by § 61, a right to 
restitution from identifiable property is superior to the competing rights 
of a creditor of the recipient who is not a bona fide purchaser or payee 
of the property in question.  Acquisition of a judicial lien (by 
attachment, garnishment, judgment, execution, or the like) does not 
make the lien creditor a purchaser of the property subject to lien. . . .20 
Section 6 establishes that, on the facts of Case 1, Bank A has a claim in 
restitution against Bank B.  Section 55 establishes that, provided the 
disputed funds are specifically identifiable in Bank B’s hands,21  Bank A is 
entitled to constructive trust relief.  Section 60 establishes that Bank A’s 
constructive trust claim has priority over Bank B’s trustee in bankruptcy, 
given that the trustee is not a purchaser for value of the property in 
question.  The trustee acts as the representative of the general creditors and 
so she stands in the same position as they do relative to Bank A’s claim.  
The general creditors, in turn, are not purchasers for value because:  
(1) with the exception of judicial lien creditors (or execution creditors, as 
they are known in England and other parts of the Commonwealth), an 
unsecured creditor has no claim to any particular asset belonging to the 
debtor; and (2) a judicial lien creditor may have a claim to the disputed 
                                                                                                                 
 20. RESTATEMENT §§ 6, 55, 60. 
 21. As to which, see infra notes 49–54 (addressing forms of payment). 
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asset, but the judicial lien is an involuntary transaction and so the creditor 
does not qualify as a purchaser for value.22 
Restatement Section 60, Illustration 1, which is analogous to Case 1, 
above, confirms this analysis: 
Broker’s accounts indicate that Customer has a credit balance of 
$25,000 when the true balance is zero. Broker thereafter remits $15,000 
at Customer’s request.  By the time the mistake comes to light, 
Customer is in bankruptcy.  Applying the tracing rules of § 59 . . . , 
Broker is able to identify the $15,000 paid by mistake in the closing 
balance of Customer’s bank account.  Broker asserts a right to recover 
the $15,000 via a constructive trust (§§ 6 . . , 55 . . . , 59). Bankruptcy 
Trustee opposes Broker’s claim arguing that restitution to Broker would 
be unfair to Customer’s general creditors. Because the rights of 
Customer’s creditors (or of Trustee as their representative) in the 
property of Customer cannot exceed the rights of Customer himself, 
Broker is entitled to restitution of $15,000 in priority to the claims of the 
general creditors.23 
The purpose and effect of the constructive trust remedy in cases like this is 
to give the claimant priority over the insolvent defendant’s general 
creditors. What justifies this special treatment?  According to the 
Restatement, the main argument rests on the property of the estate 
principle:  "claims of creditors (whether voluntary or involuntary) must be 
satisfied from property of the debtor, not from property of someone else in 
the debtor’s possession."24  In re Berry,25 on which Illustration 1, quoted 
above, is based,26 provides support for this proposition: 
It is urged that to compel restitution now will work injustice to the 
general creditors of the bankrupts, but this contention loses sight of the 
fact that the money in dispute never belonged to the bankrupts, and their 
creditors, upon broad principles of equity, have no more right to it than 
if the transaction of November 25th had never taken place.  If the 
trustees succeed on this appeal the creditors will receive $1,500, the 
equitable title to which was never in the bankrupts.  There can be no 
doubt of the fact that the payment to Berry & Co. was a mistake and that 
by reason of this mistake the trustees have in their possession $1,500 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See RESTATEMENT §60 cmt. b (discussing judicial lien creditors). 
 23. RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. c, illus. 1; see also id. illus. 13 (providing an illustration 
to similar effect). 
 24. RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. b. 
 25. See In re Berry, 147 F. 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1906) (holding that a mistaken payment 
to trustees in bankruptcy be returned to the mistaken payor). 
 26. See RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. b (saying that In re Berry is the basis 
for Illustration 1). 
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which, otherwise, they would not have.  The proposition that Raborg & 
Manice, who have done no wrong, shall be deprived of their property 
and that it shall be divided among creditors to whom it does not fairly 
belong, is not one that appeals to the conscience of a court of equity.27 
The trouble is that this rationalization begs the question by presupposing an 
equitable proprietary interest in the claimant.  The passage anticipates 
Cardozo J.’s famous statement in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.,28 
which the Restatement cites as the basis of the constructive trust provision 
in Section 55:29 
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of 
equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such 
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good 
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a 
trustee.30 
But this statement does not advance matters very far because it fails to 
specify the circumstances affecting the conscience of the legal title-holder.  
In relation specifically to the facts of Case 1, why is it unconscientious for 
Bank B’s trustee to retain the beneficial interest in the disputed funds?  The 
answer cannot be that the funds belong in equity to Bank A, because that is 
the very question at issue.  So if there is an answer, it must be sought 
outside the parameters of Cardozo J.’s statement. 
A suggestion commonly advanced in the academic literature is that 
Bank A qualifies as an involuntary creditor, in the sense that, because it 
made the payment by mistake, it did not voluntarily accept the risk of Bank 
B’s insolvency, and this distinguishes its claim sufficiently from the claims 
of ordinary unsecured creditors to justify giving it priority.31  Of course, 
there are other kinds of involuntary creditors, of which tort claimants are 
the most prominent example, who, as the law presently stands, do not enjoy 
priority in the defendant’s insolvency, and this prompts a further inquiry 
into the distinguishing characteristics of Bank A’s claim relative to other 
involuntary creditors.  One possible response is that Bank A’s claim rests on 
the twin pillars of:  (1) its status as an involuntary creditor; and (2) the fact 
                                                                                                                 
 27. In re Berry, 147 F. at 210, quoted in RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. b. 
 28. See Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 388 (N.Y. 1919) (ruling 
that "[t]he equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief"). 
 29. See RESTATEMENT § 55 cmt. a (quoting the passage). 
 30. Beatty, 122 N.E. at 380. 
 31. See, e.g., Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 297, 298 (noting "three elements of a constructive trust claim that favor the 
constructive trust claimant in relation to other creditors"). 
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that the disputed funds are specifically identifiable as the product of Bank 
B’s unjust enrichment.32  The Restatement appears to endorse this 
explanation in the following passage: 
Priority in this three-way contest may be explained without reference to 
formal notions of title.  Even if A’s suit for restitution is formally 
asserted against B as recipient, A’s implicit claim—to justify in 
equitable terms the remedy of constructive trust—is that B’s voluntary 
and  unsecured creditor C will be unjustly enriched, at A’s expense, if 
B’s debt to C is satisfied from assets that B obtained from A by fraud [or 
mistake].  The intuitive objection is that a debtor should not be allowed 
to rob Peter to pay Paul.33 
The statement is couched in terms of a contest between A and C, but it 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case where A’s dispute is with B’s trustee 
in bankruptcy.  This version of the argument is subject to the same logical 
difficulty as the original argument; it rests partly on the proposition that A is 
an involuntary creditor, but to distinguish A from other involuntary 
creditors it invokes the robbing Peter to pay Paul metaphor.  However, the 
validity of this characterization depends on the assumption that A has a 
proprietary interest in the first place which is independent of its status as an 
involuntary creditor.34 
B.  English and Commonwealth Law 
The leading case on point in England and the Commonwealth is Chase 
Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank (London) Ltd.35  It was common 
ground in the proceedings that the governing law was the law of the State of 
New York, but Goulding J. took New York and English law to be the same, 
holding that: "[A] person who pays money to another under a factual 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See id. (listing special "elements of a constructive trust claim that favor the 
constructive trust claimant in relation to other creditors"); see also Kull, supra note 3, at 282 
("Property obtained by fraud or mistake, like property obtained by theft, has not come into 
possession of the debtor by a voluntary transaction.  To distribute it to creditors would 
therefore result in an involuntary transfer, accomplished in two stages, from claimant to 
creditors."). 
 33. RESTATEMENT § 55 cmt. d (emphasis added). 
 34. See generally Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy:  Why All Involuntary 
Creditors Should be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2004). 
 35. Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank (London) Ltd., [1981] Ch. 105. 
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mistake retains an equitable property in it and the conscience of that other is 
subjected to a fiduciary duty in respect of his proprietary right."36 
The court relied on both English and American authority in support of 
this conclusion, including In re Berry.37  It also quoted with approval 
Story’s proposition "that the receiving of money, which consistently with 
conscience cannot be retained is, in Equity, sufficient to raise a trust in 
favor of the party, for whom, or on whose account, it was received,"38 and 
Scott’s statement that "where chattels are conveyed or money is paid by 
mistake, so that the person making the conveyance or payment is entitled to 
restitution, the transferee or payee holds the chattels or money upon a 
constructive trust."39 
In the later House of Lords decision, Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council40—which was not itself a 
mistaken payment case—Lord Browne-Wilkinson made some observations 
in passing about the Chase Manhattan Bank case, pointing out that a 
constructive trust could only be awarded if the payee bank’s conscience 
was affected which, in turn, would require proof that it was aware of the 
mistake.41  He concluded by saying that, "[a]lthough I do not accept the 
reasoning of Goulding J., Chase Manhattan may well have been rightly 
decided. . . .  Although the mere receipt of the moneys, in ignorance of the 
mistake, gives rise to no trust, the retention of the moneys after the recipient 
bank learned of the mistake may well have given rise to a constructive 
trust."42  This qualification is significant because by the time the payee 
bank’s conscience is affected by notice of the mistake, "the specific 
proceeds of the payment might have ceased to be identifiable among [its] 
assets" and "[t]he constructive trust would fail unless the subject-matter 
which it was to bind could be identified."43  
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 119. 
 37. See id. at 120 (referencing In re Berry). 
 38. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1255 (2d ed. 1839). 
 39. 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
§ 465 (4th ed. 1989). 
 40. See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council, 
[1996] A.C. 669, 689 (holding that "there is no basis for holding that a resulting trust arises 
in cases where money has been paid under a contract which is ultra vires and therefore void 
ab initio"). 
 41. See id. at 714–15 (discussing Chase Manhattan Bank). 
 42. Id. at 715 (citations omitted). 
 43. DAVID FOX, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MONEY ¶ 4.152 (2008). 
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In summary,  English case law remains unsettled:  The Chase 
Manhattan Bank case was only a first instance decision while Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson’s statement in the Westdeutsche case amounts at best to 
qualified support for the earlier decision and it substantially limits its 
application.  Among the more recent first instance cases, which go both 
ways,44 Papamichael v. National Westminster Bank (No. 2)45 is noteworthy 
for the following statement: 
Regardless of what they might actually do in practice, I fancy that most 
people who had been paid too much change would regard the excess as 
belonging to the mistaken payer.  Similarly, where a bank accidentally 
credits an account with money not due to the account holder, (mild 
schadenfreude apart) most people would regard the credit as being that 
of the bank . . .  [I]t is obvious that someone who pays money by 
mistake stands on a different footing from a supplier who knowingly 
takes the risk of non-payment and often obtains security against that 
danger.  Perhaps more to the point, once one allows of the fact that 
assets may be subject to a constructive trust where acquired in breach of 
a fiduciary relationship, I cannot see a distinction in principle that would 
preclude a trust arising where they have been acquired in consequence 
of a mistake.46 
If this view were to prevail, English law would stand on much the 
same footing as the Restatement’s account of the American position.  
However, the English case law—such as it is—has not been free from 
criticism and at this point it cannot safely be predicted what direction it 
might eventually take.  Calnan argues that the Chase Manhattan Bank case 
was wrongly decided, as a matter of both law and policy, and that in 
disputes like Case 1, Bank A should have only a personal claim for recovery 
of its payment.47  In the first place, he points out that there are two types of 
case:  (1) where A’s mistake is induced by B, for example by 
misrepresentation, duress or undue influence; and (2) cases—like the Chase 
Manhattan Bank  case—where A’s mistake was self-induced.48  In a Type 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.161 ("The recent first instance cases do little to 
resolve the issue.  Some judges are reluctant to impose a constructive trust where there has 
been a mistake, and feel more comfortable relying on recission [sic] where that is 
available . . . .  But other judges take a more expansive view."). 
 45. See Papamichael v. Nat’l Westminster Bank (No. 2), [2003] EWHC (Comm) 164 
[225] (noting that "a solvent recipient, just as much as an insolvent recipient, can confine the 
mistaken payer to a personal claim in restitution"). 
 46. Id. ¶¶ 225–29. 
 47. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.165 (noting "two reasons why . . . the remedy 
should be personal, [sic] and not proprietary"). 
 48. See id. ¶ 4.15 ("Most of the cases . . . involving proprietary claims in relation to 
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(1) case, A can rescind the contract and reclaim legal or beneficial title to 
the disputed asset, but in a Type (2) case, as a general rule, rescission is not 
available.49  An unexercised right of rescission gives the claimant "a mere 
equity" in the disputed asset.50  A mere equity falls short of beneficial title, 
which revests only upon rescission.51  In a Type (1) case, it would be 
inconsistent with this distinction to conclude that A retains or acquires a 
fully fledged equitable interest from the outset, while in a Type (2) case, 
creating an equitable interest in A’s favor "would be to give a better remedy 
to someone who has made his own mistake than would be given to 
someone whose mistake has been induced by another."52  
Furthermore, the Chase Manhattan Bank case—like Case 1, above—
involved the transfer of what Calnan refers to as "bank money," as opposed 
to "chattel money."53  By the transfer of "chattel money," he means the 
physical delivery of bank notes or coins by the payer to the payee; by the 
transfer of "bank money," he means the transfer of funds, normally by 
electronic funds transfer, from the payer’s bank to the payee’s bank.54  The 
difference is that, in the case of a transfer of chattel money, property passes 
by assignment from the payer to the payee.  But in the case of a transfer of 
bank money, the payment by the payer to the payee is effected by set-off.  
                                                                                                                 
vitiated contracts concern payments of money.  The classic case in which the problem arises 
is where A pays money to B by mistake.  That mistake may be induced by a 
misrepresentation by B.  Alternatively, B may be entirely innocent."). 
 49. Id. ¶ 4.114. 
 50. Latec Invs. v Hotel Terrigal (1965) 113 CLR 265, 277 (Austl.). 
 51. Specifically, beneficial title can be defeated by a bona fide  purchaser of the legal 
estate for value and without notice of the equitable claim, whereas in the case of a mere 
equity, the bona fide purchaser rule is not limited to the case where the purchaser acquires 
legal title.  See  CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.89 ("If . . . A only has an equity in an asset of 
which B is the legal owner, A is entitled to enforce that equity against anyone other than a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice.").  American law also recognizes the concept 
of a "mere equity" in cases involving voidable title.  See Kull, supra note 3, at 281–82 
("Fraud or mistake makes a transfer subject to rescission.  The transferee has what is called 
‘voidable title,’ though the transferee can give good title to a subsequent good faith 
purchaser; meanwhile the transferor has what used to be called ‘an equity.’").  But, the 
distinction between "equities" and "equitable interests" seems to have been elided.  See id. at 
265 (using the expressions interchangeably). 
 52. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.116; see also ¶¶ 4.121–4.124 (explaining, in ¶ 4.123, 
that "[t]o create an equitable interest under a constructive trust where recission [sic] is 
available would be inconsistent with the doctrine of rescission and to do so where rescission 
is not available would be to give the transferor greater rights where the transferee was 
innocent than where he was fraudulent").  
 53. Id. ¶ 4.144. 
 54. See id. ¶¶ 4.15 et seq. (discussing various payment methods). 
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If the payer’s bank happens also to be the payee’s bank, the netting exercise 
will be a bilateral one.  Calnan writes: 
Where the account is in credit, the bank is accordingly authorized and 
instructed to make a payment to the payee and to reduce the amount 
which it owes to the payer by a corresponding amount.  To the extent of 
the amount of the payment, the debt owing by the bank to the payer is 
extinguished, not transferred.  What the payee obtains is a new, direct, 
right against the bank for a corresponding amount, not a right over a 
debt owing by the bank to the payer.55 
In other words, there is a novation, not an assignment.56  If the parties have 
different banks, the netting exercise will be a multilateral one.  As Calnan 
explains, "Multilateral netting involves a contractual arrangement between 
the parties whereby they agree to release claims against the others in 
consideration for a net claim against, or liability to, one or more of the other 
parties.  No property passes hands."57 
The implication of this analysis is that, in a mistaken payment case 
involving the transfer of bank money, B does not receive A’s asset and so, 
contrary to what Goulding J. said in the Chase Manhattan Bank case, there 
is no basis on which A can be said to have "retained an equitable property" 
in the money.58  The only basis on which A could obtain an equitable 
proprietary interest would be if the court were to confer one on him by 
imposing a remedial constructive trust.  However, it is still not settled 
whether the remedial constructive trust is available in England, while there 
is authority to the effect that, whatever the answer to this question, a 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. ¶ 4.29. 
 56. See id.¶ 4.29 (citing Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1989] Q.B. 
728 and R. v. Preddy, [1996] A.C. 815 (House of Lords)). 
 57. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.34; see also FOX, supra note 43, ¶¶ 5.10–5.22 
(discussing payment systems). 
 58. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.126.  In the Chase Manhattan Bank case, the payment 
was made by electronic funds transfer and the question was raised whether the plaintiff 
could identify any particular assets to which a constructive trust might attach.  Goulding J. 
dismissed the suggestion saying simply that "when equitable rights are in question, the court 
does not encourage fine distinctions founded on the technicalities of financial machinery."  
Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd, [1981] Ch. 105, 121, 
quoted in CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.145.  As mentioned above, In re Berry, 147 F. 208 (2d 
Cir. 1906) was one of the cases relied on in Chase Manhattan, but the decision in Berry 
proceeds on the assumption that the transfer of bank money is analogous to the transfer of 
chattel money.  See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.144 (explaining that "[t]he main American 
authority on which Goulding J relied was Re Berry"). 
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remedial constructive trust cannot be imposed if the defendant is 
insolvent.59  More fundamentally, while 
[t]here is no doubt that the crediting of B’s account represents value 
received by B which can form the subject matter of a personal claim for 
repayment[,] B has not received A’s asset and therefore the imposition 
of an equitable proprietary interest involves the establishment of a 
constructive trust over an asset which A has never owned.60  
This aspect of Calnan’s analysis leads to the troubling conclusion that 
A’s rights may vary depending on whether the payment happens to have 
been made in bank money or chattel money.  By contrast, David Fox argues 
that "the law should aim for functionally equivalent outcomes regardless of 
whether money is paid in corporeal or incorporeal form."61  He goes on to 
suggest that the solution lies in applying to bank money transfers the tracing 
rule that property rights can be created in substituted assets which are 
obtained in an unauthorized exchange: 
To the extent that [A’s] decision to transfer the funds represented by the 
original chose in action is vitiated, it can be said that the substitution of 
the funds in [B’s] account for the funds originally in [A’s] account was 
unauthorized by [A]. [A] accordingly takes a title to the traceable 
proceeds in [B’s] bank account. [B’s] primary legal title to the proceeds 
is taken subject to [A’s competing title] arising through the unauthorized 
substitution.  If [A] elects to enforce [its] title, [it] may enforce a 
proprietary claim to the proceeds.62 
However, the practical significance of this proposition is limited in 
mistaken payment cases because the enforcement of A’s proprietary claim 
depends on the proceeds remaining traceable and, as Fox acknowledges: 
[T]he consequence of the limitations imposed on the Chase Manhattan 
case by the House of Lords in [Westdeutsche] is that there are now 
likely to be insuperable obstacles to applying the reasoning in Chase 
Manhattan to mistaken payments made through a payment mechanism.  
In most instances, a mistaken payment would not be traceable unless the 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See Re Polly Peck (No.2), [1998] 3 All ER 812, 827–32 discussed in CALNAN, 
supra note 8, ¶¶  1.89–1.92 (discussing English law in light of other jurisdictions).  The 
position is the same in other parts of the Commonwealth, with the exception of Canada 
which does recognize a remedial constructive trust along the lines of the American model.  
See, e.g., Pettkus v. Becker (1989), 117 D.L.R. 3d 257 (S.C.C.) (awarding constructive trust 
relief in a property dispute following breakdown of a de facto marital relationship).  
 60. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.126.  
 61. FOX, supra note 43, ¶ 1.101. 
 62. Id. ¶ 5.83. 
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beneficiary realized the mistake as soon as the money was credited to 
his or her account.63 
Calnan says that "[t]he absence of a proprietary remedy should not 
come as any surprise.  A will have a personal remedy against B for a 
mistaken payment, and there seems to be no reason why he should also 
have a proprietary remedy."64  As for the involuntary creditor argument,65 
Calnan points to "the difficulty of trying to rank creditors by reference to 
how worthy they are to receive payment from the debtor."66  It is not self-
evidently true, he suggests, that a person who has deliberately provided 
credit to the debtor should rank behind someone who has not, or that a 
restitutionary claimant should always take priority over a contractual one.  
Moreover, giving restitutionary claimants special treatment opens the door 
for other types of creditors to claim priority (for example, tort victims or 
claimants with special needs), but adjudicating such claims is likely to be 
expensive and time-consuming to the detriment of the creditors 
collectively.67  As Calnan explains, "The real advantage of the  pari passu  
principle is not that it provides perfect justice but that it enables there to be 
a distribution of the assets of the debtor amongst his creditors in a 
reasonably fair and straightforward (and therefore cost-effective) way."68 
C.  Discussion 
If the function of a restatement is to set out the law as it is, rather than 
to suggest what the law should be, it is hard to quarrel with the 
Restatement’s treatment of the mistaken payment question.69  As the 
Restatement itself points out, American law on Case 1-type disputes is well 
settled in A’s favor:  The availability of constructive trust relief for 
mistaken payment claims and the like was "a legal commonplace" even at 
the time of Cardozo J.’s statement,70 while the constructive trust’s priority 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. ¶ 5.144. 
 64. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.127. 
 65. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (discussing involuntary creditors). 
 66. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.151. 
 67. Id. (noting "the difficulty of trying to rank creditors by reference to how worthy 
they are to receive payment from the debtor"). 
 68. Id. ¶ 1.152. 
 69. For a survey of competing views on the role of the Restatements in law reform, see 
Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror:  The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 
IND. L. REV. 205 (2007). 
 70. RESTATEMENT § 55 Reporter’s Note cmt. a. 
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in insolvency proceedings engages a dispute which "is not decades but 
centuries old.  [I]t is the contest between the judgment creditor and the 
holder of a prior equitable interest affecting the judgment debtor’s apparent 
title to property.  As a matter of non-bankruptcy law, the outcome of this 
contest is not in doubt," while Federal bankruptcy law has typically 
recognized state law property rights and there is nothing in the history or 
text of the current Bankruptcy Code to upset this tradition.  "This is not to 
say that the choice made by the courts is self-evidently desirable as a matter 
of policy," but it is up to Congress to eliminate A’s priority if it thinks 
necessary.71  Some American courts have accepted policy arguments 
similar to Calnan’s, denying constructive trust relief in the defendant’s 
bankruptcy on the ground that it violates the pari passu principle.72  True to 
form, the Restatement criticizes these aberrant case law developments, not 
explicitly on policy grounds but, rather, because they fly in the face of 
settled case law and because there is no legislative basis for them in the 
Bankruptcy Code.73  
A principal justification for the constructive trust remedy in mistaken 
payment cases is that the disputed funds belong in equity to the payer and 
so limiting the payer to a personal claim in the defendant’s bankruptcy 
would be "robbing Peter to pay Paul."  As discussed above, the weakness in 
this argument is that it begs the question concerning the existence of the 
payer’s title.  However, this feature is not unique to the mistaken payment 
context.  Equitable proprietary interests rest on the maxim that "equity 
deems as done what ought to be done" and the application of this maxim 
inevitably results in arguments that are question-begging, conclusory or 
circular.  Even the most familiar of equitable entitlements, such as the 
interest of a trust beneficiary and the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, are 
                                                                                                                 
 71. RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. f. 
 72. See, e.g., XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Group Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 
1452 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Constructive trusts are anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since 
they take from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors, not from the offending 
debtor.").  For a critical analysis of the case, see Kull, supra note 3. 
 73. The Restatement explains: 
If § 544(a)(3) gives the trustee the full powers of a bona fide purchaser to take 
property of the debtor free of prior equities—including interests created by law 
and not susceptible of record—it awards the trustee a power that the judicial lien 
creditor has for centuries been denied. The result would be nothing less than a 
revolution in the law of priorities—not just in the common law and equity 
jurisprudence of the states, but in the consistent practice under the Bankruptcy 
Act. 
RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. f. 
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subject to these logical infirmities.  What happens is that, with the passing 
of time and the accumulation of case law, the logical infirmities end up 
being forgotten, stare decisis kicks in, and the accumulated case law itself 
becomes the basis of the claim. 
The differences between the American and English positions identified 
above can probably be accounted for on the basis that the two legal systems 
are at different stages of development on this particular issue.  In the United 
States, the availability of constructive trust relief in mistaken payment cases 
is long-settled and so it is probably too late now for the courts to revisit the 
underlying policy questions.  If change is required, legislative intervention 
is now the only available option.  English and Commonwealth courts, by 
contrast, are working with a relatively clean slate and so they still have 
room both to question the logical underpinnings of constructive trust relief 
in mistaken payment cases and to shape the law by reference to the 
doctrinal and policy issues discussed above.  Ultimately, the question boils 
down to a choice between, on the one hand, maximizing the value of the 
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the creditors collectively, even if this 
means doing rough justice to some types of claim and, on the other hand, 
striving to achieve a higher form of justice for certain individual claimants 
even if this means diminishing the returns to the creditors as a group.   
The tension between these objectives calls to mind the opposition 
between the economic concepts of allocative efficiency (where the concern 
is with increasing the size of the pie) and distributional equity (where the 
concern is with how the pie is sliced).  There may also be a clash of legal 
cultures in play, between bankruptcy lawyers on the one hand and 
restitution lawyers on the other.  It is probably fair to say that restitution 
lawyers are by both training and predisposition more likely to favor 
individual restitution claims over the collective interest of all the creditors, 
while bankruptcy lawyers tend to be skeptical of special claims.  Calnan 
writes from a bankruptcy viewpoint, while the Restatement, naturally 
enough, is written from a restitution standpoint.  On this basis, the prospects 
for reforms along the line Calnan envisages may depend, at least in part, on 
who happens to be behind the wheel at the critical time. 
III.  Misrepresentation (1) 
Case 2.  A is induced by B’s misrepresentation to sell Blackacre to B. 
B becomes bankrupt before A discovers the misrepresentation.  Can A 
rescind the contract? 
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A.  The Restatement 
As in Case 1, the answer to the question has important bankruptcy 
implications.  If A is able to rescind the contract, B’s bankruptcy trustee will 
have to re-convey Blackacre to A and, in the meantime, the trustee holds the 
property on constructive trust for A.  The upshot is that A recovers the 
property in specie, pro tanto diminishing the amount available for 
distribution among B’s other creditors.  On the other hand, if A cannot 
rescind, she will be limited to a personal claim for damages ranking on a 
pari passu basis with B’s other unsecured creditors.74  The governing 
Restatement provisions are Sections 13, 54, and 60. 
Section 13 provides in relevant part as follows: 
§13. Fraud and Misrepresentation:  Rescission 
(1) A transfer induced by fraud or by material misrepresentation is 
subject to rescission and restitution.  The transferee is liable in 
restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.75 
Section 54 provides in part: 
§ 54.  Rescission and Restitution 
(1) A person who has transferred money or other property may avoid the 
legal effect of the transaction and recover the property transferred if 
(a) the transaction is invalid or subject to avoidance for a reason 
identified in another section of this Restatement, and 
(b) the requirements of this Section may be satisfied.76 
The provision goes on to specify that:  rescission requires a mutual 
restoration and accounting between the parties which involves, among other 
things, restoring property received from the other; a pre-condition for 
rescission is restoration of the defendant to the status quo ante; and 
rescission is a discretionary remedy, subject to "the interests of justice" and, 
in particular, under Section 54(4)(c), "[i]f rescission would prejudice 
intervening rights of third parties, the remedy will on that account be 
denied."77  Comment l, Rights of third parties, explains that this provision 
refers to "someone who has acquired an interest in the property, such as a 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See RESTATEMENT § 13 cmt. i (discussing the "two-step remedial process" of 
"[r]escission of a completed transfer"). 
 75. Id. § 13(1). 
 76. Id. § 54. 
 77. Id. § 54(4)(c). 
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mortgagee or other purchaser for value, through subsequent dealings with 
the original transferee."78  In other words, the provision complements 
Section 60 which, as noted above, adds the rider that, for the purpose of the 
rule, a judicial lien creditor is not a purchaser.79 
Section 13 establishes that, on the facts of Case 2, A may rescind the 
contract.  Section 54 reaffirms this proposition and also establishes that, 
upon rescission, A becomes entitled to a reconveyance of Blackacre.  
Restatement Section 54 Illustration 2 confirms this analysis: 
A conveys Blackacre to B in exchange for B’s promise to pay $100,000 
one year later.  B fails to pay, whereupon A discovers that the 
transaction was induced by B’s fraud.  A can enforce B’s contractual 
obligation to pay.  Alternatively, A may choose to rescind the 
conveyance and recover Blackacre from B . . . .  Specific relief to A 
might be described in terms of rescission, or cancellation, or 
constructive trust, or quieting title in A, or by an order directing B to 
reconvey to A. The language employed makes no difference to the 
outcome.80  
Section 60 establishes that A’s right of rescission has priority over a judicial 
lien creditor and, by extension, B’s trustee in bankruptcy. Restatement 
Section 60 Illustration 3 confirms this proposition: 
Victim conveys Blackacre to Swindler, induced by Swindler’s 
fraudulent misrepresentations . . . Creditor obtains a judgment against 
Swindler for $50,000.  By statute, Creditor’s judgment becomes a lien 
on all of Swindler’s interests in real property within the jurisdiction . . . 
In a contest between Victim and Swindler, Victim would be entitled to 
restitution of Blackacre . . . Creditor’s judgment lien attaches only to 
Swindler’s interest in Blackacre. Because a judicial lien creditor is not a 
purchaser for value, Creditor acquires no better rights vis-à-vis Victim 
than Swindler had. Victim recovers Blackacre . . . free of Creditor’s 
judgment lien.81 
B.  English and Commonwealth Law 
English and Commonwealth law is similar.  Calnan writes:  
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. cmt. l. 
 79. See id. § 60(1) ("Acquisition of a judicial lien (by attachment, garnishment, 
judgment, execution, or the like) does not make the lien creditor a purchaser of the property 
subject to lien."). 
 80. Id. § 54 cmt. d, illus. 2. 
 81. Id. § 60 cmt. c, illus. 3. 
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The cases . . . establish the general proposition that, if A transfers title in 
an asset to B as a result of a vitiating factor induced by B (such as B’s 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence) then, on 
discovering the true facts: 
• A can rescind the contract; and 
• the effect of the rescission is to revest title to the asset in A.82 
Following rescission, beneficial title to Blackacre revests in A pending 
reconveyance of the legal estate by B’s trustee in bankruptcy.  Prior to 
rescission, A has a lesser proprietary interest in Blackacre, which is referred 
to as "an equity" or a "mere equity" and which is a function of A’s as yet 
unexercised right to rescind the contract.  A’s equity is enforceable in B’s 
bankruptcy.  A leading case is In re Eastgate, Ex parte Ward,83 where the 
court said: 
Now did the property at the time [of A’s rescission] form part of the 
estate of the bankrupt?  I do not think it did, and for this reason.  I think 
that the trustee acquired the interest of the bankrupt in the property 
subject to the rights of third parties. One of those rights in this case was 
the right of the vendors of the goods to disaffirm the contract and to 
retake possession of the goods.84 
Calnan suggests that, if the matter were free from authority, it would 
be open to question whether A should have a proprietary claim in these 
circumstances.85  It is true that B’s representation entitles A to rescind the 
contract, but the remedy could be administered on a purely personal basis, 
by means of an accounting between the parties.  On that approach, A would 
obtain no advantage over B’s general creditors and would be entitled to 
share in the bankruptcy distribution on a pari passu basis only.86  However, 
the case law to the contrary is settled and it is too late now to wind back the 
clock. 
                                                                                                                 
 82. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.76. 
 83. In re Eastgate, Ex parte Ward, [1905] 1 K.B. 465, 467 (holding that a vendor could 
take back goods for which a bankrupt never paid). 
 84. Id. at 467; see also Tilley v. Bowman, [1910] 1 K.B. 745 (applying Eastgate). 
 85. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.75 ("If the issue were free from authority, one 
might ask why he should be able to do so."). 
 86. See id. ¶ 4.75 ("A can seek to have the transaction set aside . . . .  But that remedy 
could be entirely personal . . . .  It does not necessarily follow that a right to rescind should 
carry with it the automatic revesting of a proprietary interest by the act of rescission."). 
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IV.  Misrepresentation (2) 
Case 3.  A is induced by B’s fraudulent misrepresentation to lend 
$500,000 to B.  B banks the money but becomes bankrupt before disbursing 
any of the funds and before A discovers the misrepresentation.  There are 
no other funds in the account.  Can A rescind the loan contract with B? 
A.  The Restatement 
According to the Restatement, American law treats this case the same 
as Case 2.  In other words, it makes no difference that the disputed subject-
matter is money rather than land or other property.  Restatement Section 60, 
Illustration 6 confirms this conclusion: 
Customers remit $500,000 to Investment Co. for purposes of 
investment. Discovering thereafter that they had been defrauded, 
Customers bring suit for rescission and restitution against Investment 
Co.  The court issues an order barring disbursement of the $200,000 
balance of Investment Co.’s account with Bank.  While Customers’ suit 
is pending, Creditor obtains a judgment against Investment Co. for 
$50,000 in unpaid bills and a lien by garnishment of Investment Co.’s 
account with Bank.  Creditor intervenes in Customers’ action against 
Investment Co. and Bank to assert the priority of his lien.  The court 
determines that the whole of the $200,000 balance held by Bank can be 
traced to Customers’ most recent remittances to Investment Co.; by 
contrast, Creditor does not assert that any part of the balance is the 
product of his property.  Because Investment Co. holds the $200,000 in 
constructive trust for Customers, the funds are not property of 
Investment Co. to which Creditor’s garnishment lien can attach.  Bank 
will be directed to pay $200,000 to Customers and nothing to Creditor.87 
For reasons previously discussed, the result would be the same if the 
dispute had been between Customers and Investment Co.’s trustee in 
bankruptcy. 
B.  English and Commonwealth Law 
There are cases suggesting that English and Commonwealth law is 
consistent with the position as set out in the Restatement.  For example, in 
                                                                                                                 
 87. RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. c, illus. 6; see also id. § 13 cmt. h, illus. 26 (discussing 
constructive trust protecting funds of victim of embezzlement from a tax lien); id. § 60 cmt. 
f, illus. 14 (discussing considerations of priority in bankruptcy). 
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El-Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings,88 Millett J. said that, if a person "[has] 
been induced to purchase . . . shares by false and fraudulent 
misrepresentations, they are entitled to rescind the transaction and revest 
the equitable title to the purchase money in themselves, at least to the extent 
necessary to support an equitable tracing claim."89  However, Calnan 
disputes the correctness of these decisions on the ground that they overlook 
the distinction between transfers of chattel money and payments of bank 
money:  
[P]ayments of bank money do not result in A’s asset coming into the 
hands of B. Value passes from A to B by crediting and debiting 
accounts with third parties, not by the transfer of any asset from A to B.  
In principle, therefore, it would seem that rescission can have only a 
personal, and not a proprietary, effect in the case of payments of money.  
On rescission, an asset which has been transferred by A to B will revest 
in A.  With a money payment, no asset passes from A to B, and there is 
therefore nothing which A can identify in B’s hands as being an asset 
which A originally owned.90 
Fox takes a different view, relying on the principle that "property 
rights can be created in substituted assets which are obtained in an 
unauthorized exchange."91  He says:  "Once the court ordered rescission of 
the transaction, [B] would hold his or her legal interest in the traceable 
credit balance in his or her account on resulting trust for [A].  If [B] were 
the fraudster, then [A] could also elect to assert an equitable lien over the 
account."92 
Moreover, A "would be better placed to trace and recover a voidable 
payment" in a misrepresentation case (Case 3) than she would in a mistaken 
payment case (Case 1).93  This is because, in Case 3, the ground for A’s 
rescission is B’s wrongful conduct and, if B is "a wrongdoer from the 
outset, [A can] rely from that point on the more favourable evidential 
                                                                                                                 
 88. El-Ajou v. Dollar Land Holding Plc (No. 1), [1993] B.C.C. 698, 713 (ruling that 
once one "rescind[s] . . . purchases for fraud [he] can then invoke the assistance of equity to 
follow property of which he is the equitable owner"). 
 89. Id.; see also Daly v Sydney Stock Exch. (1986) 160 CLR 371, 387 (Austl.) 
("Irrespective of the fairness of its terms, equity regards a contract made between a fiduciary 
and the person to whom he stands in a fiduciary relationship as voidable if the fiduciary has 
breached his fiduciary duty in respect of the contract.") (Brennan, J.). 
 90. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.105. 
 91. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (distinguishing novation from 
assignment). 
 92. FOX, supra note 43, ¶ 5.151. 
 93. Id. ¶ 5.152. 
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presumptions to trace the value represented by his payment [into B’s] 
account.  [B] would not encounter the problem faced by the mistaken 
originator of money in the period before [B] realized the originator’s 
mistake."94 
C.  Discussion 
Calnan concedes that in a situation like Case 2, above, A has a 
proprietary claim which gives it priority in B’s bankruptcy, but this is only 
because there is settled case law on point.   However, he argues that the 
cases are contrary to principle and that, in principle, A should be limited to 
a personal claim.  In a Case 3-type situation, the case law is less settled and 
this allows him to take a more robust stance, arguing that the cases are 
wrong and should not be followed in future.  However, Fox takes a contrary 
view of the English position which appears to be more in line with United 
States law, as represented in the Restatement.  Which of these conflicting 
approaches is preferable from a policy standpoint? 
The policy arguments in support of the United States approach are 
basically the same as in the mistaken payments case: 
[A] prevails over the creditors because, unlike them, he has not 
consented to be a creditor of the debtor.  Property obtained by fraud or 
mistake, like property obtained by theft, has not come into possession of 
the debtor by a voluntary transaction.  To distribute it to creditors would 
therefore result in an involuntary transfer, accomplished in two stages, 
from claimant to creditors.95 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. ¶ 5.152; cf. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 4.126, 9.93 (arguing that neither a 
resulting trust nor a constructive trust is appropriate in the circumstances).  Calnan writes:  
[As for the resulting trust], there is no basis on which A, having paid money to B 
through bank accounts, could be held to have retained a proprietary interest in 
his asset.  The only basis on which A could obtain an equitable proprietary 
interest would be by the law imposing one (by way of constructive trust) over 
that part of its credit balance with its bank which represents the mistaken 
payment. . . . 
Id. ¶ 4.126.  He adds:  
A constructive trust should not be imposed where the asset [A receives] is 
money. In such a case, the maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to 
be done can have no application, because there is unlikely to be an identifiable 
asset over which a trust can be created and, in any event, what ought to be done 
is to pay an equivalent amount, not to transfer the money received. 
Id. ¶ 9.93. 
 95. Kull, supra note 3, at 282. 
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In other words, A deserves priority because:  (1) he has a proprietary 
claim to the disputed asset; and (2) he is an involuntary creditor.  However, 
the argument is contentious.  The first limb presupposes that A has a 
proprietary claim, but that is the very point at issue.96  The second limb 
assumes that involuntary creditors deserve priority over voluntary creditors 
because they have not assumed the risk of the defendant’s bankruptcy.  But 
this is not self-evidently true and, in any event, attempts to discriminate 
between unsecured creditors are likely to promote costly litigation which 
will erode the value of the estate.  This is even more of a concern in 
misrepresentation cases than it is in the mistaken payments context.  At 
least in a mistaken payment case, once the claimant has established the 
basic facts, the conclusion that he is an involuntary creditor will be 
relatively uncontroversial.  But in a misrepresentation case, the plaintiff’s 
status as an involuntary creditor will often be contentious.  For example, if 
the defendant tricks the plaintiff into a transfer of the disputed asset, it 
could be argued that the plaintiff is an involuntary creditor because the 
defendant’s conduct subverted the plaintiff’s choice.   
On the other hand, it could just as plausibly be argued that the risk of 
fraud is an incident of contracting and, while it justifies a remedy, it does 
not justify giving the plaintiff priority in the defendant’s bankruptcy.  Emily 
Sherwin says that the distinction turns on a number of variables including 
                                                                                                                 
 96. At least as a matter of English and Commonwealth law, the theft analogy is open 
to question because, in the case of theft, the victim has no intention of transferring the 
disputed asset to the thief, whereas in a mistaken payment or misrepresentation case, the 
mistake or misrepresentation does not negate intention; it simply means the transferor’s 
intention was formed on a false basis.  See FOX, supra note 43, ¶¶ 4.86–4.91 (discussing 
theft of corporeal money (chattel money)); id. ¶¶ 5.121–5.130 (discussing theft of 
incorporeal money (bank money)); id. ¶¶ 6.03–6.18 (discussing voidable transfers and 
rescission).  In Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson,  [2004] 1 A.C. 919 (H.L.), the following 
statement appears: 
Fraud does not negative intention.  A person’s intention is a state of mind. Fraud 
does not negative a state of mind.  The existence of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation means that a person’s intention is formed on a false basis—a 
basis, moreover, known by the other party to be false.  The effect of fraud is to 
negative legal rights or obligations flowing from an intention to enter into a 
contract . . . .  This distinction, between negativing intention or consent and 
negativing the rights otherwise flowing from intention or consent, is important.  
It explains why the law treats a contract induced by fraud as voidable, not void.  
The necessary coincidence of intention, or consensus ad idem, may exist even 
where the intention and consent of the victim were induced by fraud.  An 
intention thus induced is regarded by the law as sufficient to found a contract, 
even though the victim may repudiate the contract as soon as he discovers the 
fraud. 
Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson, [2004] 1 A.C. 919, 932 (H.L.) (Lord Nicholls). 
1254 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229 (2011) 
the nature of the fraud and the plaintiff’s commercial sophistication and that 
"the constructive trust claimant’s position as a voluntary creditor is a 
question of degree."97  But answers to questions of degree are hard to 
anticipate in advance, and so an approach like the one Sherwin describes 
would increase the uncertainty of litigation outcomes.  In this connection, a 
leading Canadian text remarks that: 
all else being equal, society as a whole has an interest in a system that 
minimizes the costs associated with the resolution of restitutionary 
claims and the effects of insolvency.  Consequently, a complicated 
regime that turns largely on judicial discretion may be undesirable 
insofar as it inhibits settlements and encourages litigation.98 
Kull’s analysis of the Omegas Group case illustrates the concern 
nicely.  There the claimant paid the debtor in advance for computers the 
debtor was to purchase from IBM on the claimant’s behalf.  The debtor 
became bankrupt and the claimant, arguing that its payments were induced 
by the debtor’s fraudulent misrepresentations, claimed a constructive trust 
over the disputed funds in the debtor’s hands.  According to Kull, the 
question the court should have asked (but did not) is whether the claimant 
had been "so far deceived about the risks it was running that in advancing 
funds to [the debtor] it did not act voluntarily."99  The question is a close 
call: 
On the one hand, late period transactions of this kind occur closer in 
time to the bankruptcy, inspiring the claim that the debtor has made 
(implicitly or otherwise) fraudulent representations of solvency.  On the 
other hand, a late-period seller—by comparison with creditors of longer 
standing—is likely to have dealt with the debtor on the basis of a higher 
appraisal of the risk of insolvency.  Any perceived decline in the 
debtor’s creditworthiness will have been compensated for by more 
favorable terms.100 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Sherwin, supra note 31, at 352.  As Kull explains:  
[T]he issue of restitution in bankruptcy ultimately depends on a comparison of 
the respective positions of the restitution claimant and the general creditors vis-
à-vis the debtor.  The stronger the showing that the debtor holds property 
obtained in a nonconsensual transfer, the stronger the case for restitution to 
prevent the unjust enrichment of the general creditors at the expense of the 
claimant. 
Kull, supra note 3, at 274. 
 98. A.H. OOSTERHOFF ET AL., OOSTERHOFF ON TRUSTS 792–93 (7th ed. 2009). 
 99. Kull, supra note 3, at 274. 
 100. Id. at 274–75. 
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In the Omegas Group case itself, it seems there was evidence to 
support the latter hypothesis, but in other cases the indications may be less 
clear and it may not be so easy for the court to arrive at the correct 
interpretation of the facts or for the parties to predict in advance of the case 
what the court’s decision might be.  
V. Wrongful Gains 
Case 4.  A engages B, a real estate agent, to purchase a commercial 
property on A’s behalf.  B purchases the property for himself at a price of 
$500,000, concealing the purchase from A by telling him that the vendor 
has changed his mind about selling.  B goes into bankruptcy.  Can A claim 
a constructive trust over the property? 
A.  The Restatement 
Case 4 is a variation on the facts of a Supreme Court of Canada case, 
Soulos v. Korkontzilas,101 an important difference being that, in Soulos, the 
defendant was not insolvent.  Comparable American cases include Funk v. 
Tifft,102 Quinn v. Phipps,103 and H-B Ltd. Partnership v. Wimmer.104  The 
governing Restatement provisions are Sections 43, 55, and 60.  Section 43 
provides in part that a person who obtains a benefit in breach of a fiduciary 
duty is accountable for the benefit so obtained to the person to whom the 
duty is owed.105  As previously seen, Section 55 provides for constructive 
trust relief in cases where a recipient is unjustly enriched by the acquisition 
of property "in violation of the claimant’s rights,"106 while Section 60 as a 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 1 (Can.) (holding that "a 
constructive trust over property may be imposed in the absence of enrichment of the 
defendant and corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff"). 
 102. See Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 24–27 (9th Cir. 1975) (imposing a constructive 
trust over land which a real estate agent and others bought after a third party had already 
agreed to buy the land). 
 103. See Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 425–27 (Fla. 1927) (imposing a constructive 
trust over land in favour of a purchaser). 
 104. See H-B Ltd. P’ship v. Wimmer, 257 S.E.2d 770, 774 (Va. 1979) (finding a 
constructive trust over land in favor of principals whose agent bought the land for himself in 
violation of his fiduciary duties). 
 105. See RESTATEMENT § 43 ("A person who obtains a benefit (a) in breach of a 
fiduciary duty . . . is liable in restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed."). 
 106. Id. § 55. 
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general rule gives priority to constructive trust claims and the like in the 
defendant’s insolvency.107 
In Case 4, A and B’s relationship is a fiduciary one and B’s conduct 
amounts to a breach of fiduciary obligation.  Restatement Section 43 
establishes B’s obligation to account for the benefit he has obtained, while 
Section 55 establishes A’s right to constructive trust relief.  Restatement 
Section 43 Illustration 10 confirms this analysis: 
Purchaser retains Broker to assist him in acquiring Blackacre, offering to 
pay $50,000 for the property plus a 10 percent commission.  Broker 
undertakes to locate the owner of Blackacre and to transmit Purchaser’s 
offer.  Broker buys Blackacre himself for $30,000.  The agreement 
between Purchaser and Broker, not being in writing, is unenforceable 
under local law, but Broker has nevertheless violated his duty of loyalty to 
Purchaser.  Purchaser may obtain ownership of Blackacre via constructive 
trust, on payment to Broker of $30,000 without commission 
(§ 51(5)(c)).108 
Section 60 gives A’s constructive trust priority over B’s trustee in 
bankruptcy.109 
Assume Blackacre increases in value after B acquires it and, at the date 
of the trial, it is worth $750,000.  Restatement Section 61 provides that: 
When restitution is based on a wrongful interference with the claimant’s 
legally protected interests, the claimant may have a prima facie 
entitlement (as against a recipient at fault or a successor in interest) to a 
recovery exceeding the amount of the claimant’s loss.  In such a case, 
however, 
(a) the portion of the restitution claim exceeding the claimant’s loss 
is subordinated to the claims of the recipient’s creditors . . . .110 
In the case under consideration, A’s loss is not limited to the value of 
Blackacre at the time of B’s wrongdoing ($500,000).  It extends to 
Blackacre’s current value ($750,000) because, but for B’s wrongful conduct, 
the increase in value would have belonged to A.  In short, on these facts 
Restatement Section 61 does not limit A’s recovery.  
Now assume that Blackacre drops in value after B acquires it so that, at 
the date of the trial, it is worth only $300,000.  On these facts, A suffers no 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See id. § 60 ("Except as otherwise provided by statute and by § 61, a right to 
restitution from identifiable property is superior to the competing rights of a creditor of the 
recipient who is not a bona fide purchaser or payee of the property in question."). 
 108. Id. § 43 cmt. d, illus. 10. 
 109. See Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 420–32 (Fla. 1927) (discussing priority). 
 110. RESTATEMENT § 61. 
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monetary loss as a consequence of B’s wrongdoing.  On the contrary, he is 
apparently better off because B’s intervention has enabled him to avoid a 
bad bargain.  In normal circumstances, therefore, one would expect A not to 
pursue his claim against B.  But suppose that A has a sentimental 
attachment to Blackacre and wants the property regardless of its drop in 
value.111  If B were solvent, A would be entitled to constructive trust relief, 
conditional on paying B’s $500,000 outlay on Blackacre.  The justification 
is that the function of the constructive trust remedy in fiduciary cases is not 
just to reverse the defendant’s unjust enrichment, but also to deter fiduciary 
wrongdoing and, as the Restatement points out, "[t]o this end, a liability in 
restitution by the rule of [Section 43] does not depend on proof either that 
the claimant has sustained quantifiable economic injury or that the 
defendant has earned a net profit from the transaction."112  
However, in the case under consideration, B is insolvent and so 
Restatement Section 61 applies.  Since A has suffered no quantifiable 
economic loss, the result will be to subordinate his constructive trust claim 
to B’s general creditors.  The justification is that the deterrence rationale for 
constructive trust relief has no application in the defendant’s bankruptcy: 
[T]he justification of the remedy disappears if a supracompensatory 
award to the restitution claimant would come at the expense of a third 
party [the defendant’s unsecured creditors] who is innocent of the 
underlying wrong . . . [T]he standard justifications for a recovery in 
restitution exceeding the claimant’s loss—whether expressed in the 
language of unjust enrichment, or in terms of economic incentives—
have [no] bearing on a case in which the interests opposed to the 
restitution claim are those of the wrongdoer’s general creditors.  The 
creditors are not enriched in consequence of their own wrong, nor have 
they engaged in profitable misconduct from which a disgorgement 
liability will potentially deter them.113  
Ironically, on the facts in question, the result Restatement Section 61 
leads to may not appeal to B’s trustee in bankruptcy.  A’s constructive trust 
probably does not prejudice the unsecured creditors because they will have 
no special attachment to Blackacre and so removal of the property from the 
estate would not diminish the pool of assets available for distribution.  On 
the contrary, given A’s undertaking to reimburse B’s outlay, the property’s 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See, e.g., Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) (holding that a real 
estate agent who had purchased land for himself in breach of fiduciary duty to his client held 
the property on constructive trust for the client). 
 112. RESTATEMENT § 43 cmt. b. 
 113. Id. § 61 cmt. a–b. 
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removal may actually increase the asset pool by ridding the estate of a bad 
bargain.  If so, B’s trustee will contract around his Section 61 rights and 
admit A’s claim. 
The bribe cases offer a perhaps more salient example of the problem 
under consideration.  To adapt the facts of the famous English case, Lister 
& Co. v. Stubbs,114 assume B is employed by A as a purchasing officer.  B 
accepts secret commissions from a supplier, C, in return for purchasing 
supplies from C.  B uses the money profitably to buy shares.  However, B 
accumulates significant debts and ends up in bankruptcy.  Can A claim a 
constructive trust over the shares?  As in the previous examples, under 
Section 43, B’s conduct is in breach of fiduciary obligation and so B must 
account to A for the benefit he has obtained.  If B were solvent, under 
Section 55 A would be entitled to a constructive trust over B’s share 
portfolio on the basis that the shares are traceable proceeds of the bribe 
money.  Restatement Section 55 Illustration 28, which is based on the 
facts of Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid,115 confirms this 
analysis: 
Prosecutor accepts $1 million in bribes in exchange for favorable 
treatment of criminals. Prosecutor is liable to State in restitution for 
the amount of the bribes and any profits derived therefrom (§§ 43, 51).  
To the extent that any portion of the money paid as bribes and its 
traceable product may be identified in Prosecutor’s bank accounts 
(applying the tracing rules of § 59), Prosecutor holds those funds in 
constructive trust for State. State establishes at trial that Prosecutor 
used bribe money to purchase two houses, giving one to his Wife and 
the other to his Lawyer (as payment for legal services).  Wife had no 
notice of the source of the funds, but she took her house as donee.  
Lawyer took the house for value, but with notice that it was purchased 
with bribe money.  Both Wife and Lawyer hold their houses in 
constructive trust for State.116 
However, since B is bankrupt, A will be limited to a money claim for 
the amount of his loss, secured by an equitable lien on the shares:117 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, (1890) L.R. 45 Ch.D. 1, 14 (Eng.) (holding that where 
a defendant who obtains secret profits in breach of fiduciary obligation, the plaintiff is 
entitled only to a money remedy for an amount equivalent to the profits unlawfully 
obtained). 
 115. See Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 324 (P.C.) 331 
(appeal taken from N.Z.) (ruling that "[w]hen a bribe is accepted by a fiduciary in breach of 
his duty then he holds that bribe in trust for the person to whom the duty was owed"); see 
also RESTATEMENT § 55 reporter’s note cmt. m (noting Reid as the basis for the illustration). 
 116. RESTATEMENT § 55 cmt. m, illus. 28. 
 117. See RESTATEMENT §§ 60–61. 
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Restatement, Sections 60 and 61. Restatement Section 61 Illustration 1 
confirms this analysis: 
Treasurer embezzles $40,000 from Township, using these funds to 
acquire goods.  When the theft is discovered, the goods (constituting the 
traceable product of the embezzled funds) are worth $50,000.  In a two-
party contest between Township and Treasurer, Township would be 
entitled to ownership of the goods via a constructive trust, despite the 
fact that such a remedy gives Township more than it lost.  Because 
Treasurer is insolvent, however, restitution to Township via constructive 
trust would be made at the expense of Treasurer’s creditors.  In these 
circumstances, Township’s restitution claim has its ordinary priority 
(§ 60(1)) only to the extent of Township’s loss from Treasurer’s 
embezzlement ($40,000 plus interest).  Correct priority is achieved by 
awarding Township an equitable lien on the goods in the amount of 
$40,000 plus interest, rather than a constructive trust.118 
The challenge in the bribe cases is to quantify A’s loss for the purposes 
of the rule in Restatement Section 61.  In contrast to the Treasurer-
Township example, A’s loss does not correspond to B’s gain because the 
bribe moneys never belonged to A.  In a Lister & Co. v. Stubbs-type case, 
A’s loss is presumably the supra-competitive prices it paid for supplies as a 
result of the defendant’s conduct, while in Reid’s case, the plaintiff’s loss 
was the damage done to the criminal justice system.  However, this amount 
may be impossible to measure in money terms and the implication, in the 
context of Restatement Section 61, is that the claimant will be denied 
recovery. 
B.  English and Commonwealth Law 
There are numerous cases in England and the Commonwealth which 
support constructive trust relief for breach of fiduciary obligation.119  
However, none of the cases—at least the leading ones—involves an 
insolvent defendant and so there is no clear authority on the question at 
hand.  For example, it is unclear what the decision in Soulos v. Korkontzilas 
might have been if the defendant were bankrupt.  Canadian law recognizes 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. § 61 cmt. b, illus. 1. 
 119. See, e.g., Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.) 103 (stating that "an agent 
is . . . liable to account for profits he makes out of trust property if there is a possibility of 
conflict between his interest and his duty to his principal") (Lord Cohen).  But for a critical 
analysis of these cases, see Sinclair Invs. (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Fin. Ltd., [2010] 
EWHC (Ch) 1614. 
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the remedial constructive trust, which is a discretionary remedy.  However, 
the discretion can cut both ways:  in other words, the court could use the 
defendant’s bankruptcy as a reason to deny the remedy or, equally, as a 
reason to grant it.  As suggested above, given the peculiar facts of the case, 
a constructive trust would probably not have prejudiced the defendant’s 
creditors and so it would have made sense to grant the remedy.  However, 
not all cases are the same in this respect. 
England and other parts of the Commonwealth, Canada aside, have not 
yet embraced the remedial constructive trust.  Instead, the constructive trust 
is a form of declaratory relief aimed at confirming a pre-existing equitable 
proprietary interest.  In other words, there is a tendency towards formalism 
in the constructive trusts case law, in contrast to the functionalism which 
characterizes the Restatement’s approach.  In particular, since the 
constructive trust depends upon the establishment of a prior equitable 
claim, the courts have less room to maneuver depending on whether or not 
the defendant is bankrupt.  Perhaps for this reason—and in contrast to the 
Restatement—English and Commonwealth law takes an all or nothing 
approach to the bankruptcy question.  The cases proceed on the assumption 
that if constructive trust relief is available outside bankruptcy, it will be 
available inside bankruptcy, too, and on the same terms.  This leads to a tail 
wagging the dog kind of debate, with some courts opposing proprietary 
remedies for breach of fiduciary obligations because of the potential 
bankruptcy implications, and others favoring them for deterrence reasons, 
even if the defendant is bankrupt.  
Lister & Co. v. Stubbs and Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid 
are the leading cases.  In  Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, the plaintiff claimed a 
constructive trust over the defendant’s second generation profits, but the 
Court of Appeal limited him to a personal claim for the amount of the bribe 
money.  The defendant was not insolvent at the date of the hearing, but the 
court was clearly concerned about what might happen if he were to become 
insolvent later:  "[I]f Stubbs were to become bankrupt, this property 
acquired by him with the money paid to him by Messrs Varley would be 
withdrawn from the mass of his creditors and be handed over bodily to 
Lister & Co. Can that be right?"120 
The decision implies that the courts should be wary about granting 
constructive trust relief for breach of fiduciary obligation, even if the 
defendant is solvent, for fear either that he may not stay solvent or that the 
decision will affect the outcome of other cases where the defendant is 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, (1890) L.R. 45 Ch.D. 1, 15 (Lindley L.J). 
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insolvent.  In Reid’s case, the Privy Council took precisely the opposite 
tack, upholding the constructive trust remedy on deterrence grounds and 
dismissing the bankruptcy concerns with the statement that "the unsecured 
creditors cannot be in a better position than their debtor."121  
The trouble with the Lister & Co. v. Stubbs approach is that it arguably 
over-emphasizes bankruptcy considerations at the expense of deterrence 
considerations, while the objection to Reid’s case is the mirror-image one.  
Subsequent decisions at the trial level go in both directions.  For example, 
in Daraydan Holdings Ltd. v. Solland International Ltd.,122 the court 
followed Reid’s case, saying: 
There are powerful policy reasons for ensuring that a fiduciary does not 
retain gains acquired in violation of fiduciary duty, and I do not consider 
that it should make any difference whether the fiduciary is insolvent.  
There is no injustice to creditors in their not sharing in an asset for 
which the fiduciary has not given value, and which the fiduciary should 
not have had.123 
On the other hand, in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade 
Finance Ltd.,124 the court held that it was bound, as a matter of precedent, to 
follow Lister & Co. v. Stubbs (a Court of Appeal decision) in preference to 
Reid’s case (a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from New Zealand).  
Given these conflicting decisions, it is impossible to be sure how an English 
court would resolve Case 4, though Sinclair Investments must carry some 
weight, if only because it is the latest word.125  So far as the law in other 
parts of the Commonwealth is concerned Reid’s case is clearly binding 
authority in New Zealand, while neither Reid’s case nor Lister & Co. v. 
Stubbs  is binding in Australia.  As previously mentioned, Canada stands on 
a different footing:  As a matter of Canadian law, it is clear that, but for B’s 
bankruptcy, A would be entitled to constructive trust relief, but it is an open 
question whether B’s bankruptcy makes a difference. 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Attorney-Gen. for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 324 (P.C.) 331 (appeal 
taken from N.Z.) ( Lord Templeman).  
 122. Daraydan Holdings Ltd. v. Solland Int’l Ltd. [2004] EWHC (Ch.) 622, [2005] 
Ch.119 [51] (ruling that "[a]n agent or other fiduciary who makes a secret profit is 
accountable to his or her principal or cestui que trust" in applying Reid’s case). 
 123. Id. [86]. 
 124. Sinclair Invs. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Versailles Track Fin. Ltd. [2010] EWHC (Ch.) 1614.  
 125. The case is currently on appeal. 
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C.  Discussion 
In Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, the court limited the plaintiff to a personal 
claim for recovery of the bribe money.  From a deterrence perspective, the 
decision was clearly unsatisfactory because it allowed the defendant to keep 
all his second generation gains, so that his bribe-taking ended up being a 
very profitable venture.  The court could have done better justice to 
deterrence considerations, without compromising bankruptcy concerns, by 
awarding the plaintiff an account of profits for an amount equal to the 
defendant’s second-generation gains and some commentators see this 
solution as a way forward.126  However, even this approach may result in 
under-deterrence if the second-generation gains comprise an asset for which 
B has a special attachment or if there is a chance that the value of the 
property might increase after the judgment date.  A constructive trust is the 
only sure-fire way of reaching all B’s gains.  
The Restatement takes a different approach to balancing deterrence 
and bankruptcy objectives.  On the Restatement approach, the plaintiff’s 
claim in Lister & Co. v. Stubbs should have succeeded, because the 
defendant was not insolvent; on the other hand, if the defendant had been 
insolvent, the plaintiff would have been limited to a claim for the amount of 
its loss secured by an equitable lien over the shares.  The advantage of the 
Restatement’s solution is that it does not compromise the deterrence 
objective in cases where the defendant is not insolvent.  By the same token, 
it avoids exposing creditors to a gains-based remedy in cases where he is.  
On the other hand, critics might argue that this concession in the creditors’ 
favor does not go far enough because the restitution claimant still has 
priority for the amount of its loss and so there is the same unanswered 
question as the one that arises in the mistaken payment and 
misrepresentation cases, namely what makes restitution claims different 
enough to warrant special treatment in the defendant’s bankruptcy?  
In some situations, for example Reid’s case, it may not be possible to 
quantify the amount of the claimant’s loss and, in that event, the effect of 
Restatement Section 61, apparently, will be to deny the claimant any 
recovery at all if the defendant is insolvent.127  This is harsher even than 
Lister & Co. v. Stubbs which, as previously mentioned, would at least give 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See, e.g., CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 9.81–9.89. 
 127. See RESTATEMENT § 61 ("When restitution is based on a wrongful interference 
with the claimant’s legally protected interests . . . (a) the portion of the restitution claim 
exceeding the claimant’s loss is subordinated to the claims of the recipient’s creditors. . . ."). 
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the claimant a provable claim in the defendant’s bankruptcy for the amount 
of the bribe money. 
VI.  Specific Performance 
Case 5.  A and B enter into a contract for the sale of Blackacre. A 
pays thirty percent of the purchase price on the signing of the contract.  B 
becomes bankrupt and B’s trustee refuses to complete the transfer.  Can A 
sue for specific performance? 
A.  United States Law 
The Restatement does not address the issue Case 5 raises because 
specific performance is not a restitutionary remedy and so it falls outside 
the boundaries of the project.  Instead, the answer to the question is to be 
found in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing executory 
contracts.128  The following discussion is included for the sake of 
completeness, but it will be brief since it has nothing immediately to do 
with the Restatement, which is presently the main focus. 
Bankruptcy Code § 365 gives the trustee a right to reject, affirm and 
assign executory contracts, subject to court approval.129  The statute does 
not define "executory contract," but it is generally understood to mean a 
contract which remains partly unperformed on both sides at the date of the 
bankruptcy.130  The contract in Case 5 is an executory contract in this sense.  
The trustee’s refusal to complete the transfer is tantamount to a purported 
rejection of the contract.  The key provision is Bankruptcy Code § 365(i), 
which prevents the trustee’s right of rejection from overriding the 
purchaser’s claim for specific performance, but only if the purchaser has 
gone into possession of the property.131  The provision gives the purchaser 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (addressing executory contracts). 
 129. See id. ("(a) Except as provided in Sections 765 and 766 . . . and in subsections 
(b), (c), and (d) of this Section, the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or 
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."). 
 130. Or, more expansively:  "A contract under which the obligations of both the 
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either 
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the 
other."  Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 
(1973). 
 131. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) ("If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the 
debtor for the sale of real property . . . under which the purchaser is in possession, such 
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in possession the option of treating the contract as terminated or remaining 
in possession and continuing to make payments under the contract.132   The 
provision goes on to say that the purchaser may offset against the contract 
payments any post-rejection damages caused by non-performance of the 
debtor’s obligations under the contract and that the trustee must deliver title 
to the purchaser but is relieved of all other performance obligations.133  
Section 365(j) applies if the purchaser is not in possession and the contract 
is rejected, and it gives the purchaser a lien on the debtor’s interest in the 
property for the recovery of any part of the purchase price the purchaser has 
paid.134  The thinking behind these provisions is that a purchaser in 
possession is likely to have spent money on improvements and the like, and 
the aim is to protect its reliance interest.  (In an extreme case, failure to 
protect the purchaser’s reliance interest may trigger the purchaser’s own 
financial crisis and this would be a high price to pay for facilitating the 
debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings.)  On the other hand, the justification for 
not extending the protection to purchasers across the board lies in the pari 
passu sharing principle.135  
Now assume a contract for sale by B to A of a Van Gogh painting, 
which is still undelivered at the date B files for bankruptcy.  Outside 
bankruptcy, A would be entitled to specific performance:  damages would 
be an inadequate remedy because, given the uniqueness of the contract 
subject-matter, there is no market in which A could find a replacement.  
Does A’s specific performance claim survive B’s bankruptcy?  The 
governing provisions are Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(5)(B) and 502(c).  
Section 101(5)(B) provides that, for the purposes of the statute, "claim" 
                                                                                                                 
purchaser may treat such contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in 
possession of such real property or timeshare interest."). 
 132. See id. (giving the purchaser the option). 
 133. See id. § 365(i)(2) ("If such purchaser remains in possession—(A) [he/she] shall 
continue to make all payments due  under such contract, but may offset against such 
payments any damages occurring after the date of the rejection of such contract by the non 
performance of any obligation of the debtor after such date . . . ."). 
 134. See id. § 365(j) ("A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under 
subsection (i) of this section . . . has a lien on the interest of the debtor in such property for 
the recovery of any portion of the purchase price that such purchaser or party has paid."). 
 135. More or less the same considerations apply to the rejection of a tenancy agreement 
in the landlord’s bankruptcy and the rejection of an intellectual property license in the 
bankruptcy of the intellectual property holder, and the Bankruptcy Code treats these cases on 
a similar footing.  See id. § 365(h) (dealing with the "reject[ion of] an unexpired lease of real 
property under which the debtor is the lessor"); id. § 365(n) (dealing with the "reject[ion of] 
an executory contract under which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual 
property"). 
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includes the "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance,"136 
and § 502(c) provides that, for the purpose of allowing a claim, equitable 
remedies such as specific performance are reducible to money value.137  
One justification is that the real function of specific performance is to 
protect A’s interests in cases where damages are difficult to calculate,138 not 
to give A priority in B’s bankruptcy.  Therefore, granting A specific 
performance in B’s bankruptcy would give her an unbargained benefit.139  
An alternative justification is that § 502(c) mitigates A’s prejudice by 
giving the bankruptcy court a broad power to estimate claims without the 
constraints of state law doctrines about speculative damages.140  
B.  English and Commonwealth Law 
According to Calnan, the English position is that: 
• specific performance will be available to A if he can establish 
that he has a proprietary interest in the asset; but 
• specific performance will not be available to A if he does not 
have a proprietary interest in the asset.141 
Also: 
The basic principle is that, once a debtor company enters into insolvency 
proceedings, its insolvency officer is entitled to refuse to perform 
contracts entered into by the company, with the effect that the creditor 
will in most cases have no option but to prove as an unsecured creditor 
for damages for breach of contract.  This is the corollary of the principle 
that specific performance is not available to give effect to a personal 
right in insolvency.142 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. § 101(5)(B).  
 137. Id. § 502(c)(2) (allowing for "any right to payment arising from a right to an 
equitable remedy for breach of performance"). 
 138. For example, because the asset is unique so that there is no market price the court 
can rely on as a basis for valuation, or because the counterparty places a high subjective 
value on the asset. 
 139. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 65–66 
(1986) ("In recent contract scholarship the right of specific performance has been 
illuminatingly analyzed as a property right. . . .  [T]he relevant focus in bankruptcy . . . is a 
question of priority, not property."). 
 140. Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. 
REV. 227, 256–57 (1989) (discussing specific performance in the context of bankruptcy). 
 141. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.83. 
 142. Id. ¶ 1.94. 
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These two passages succinctly state the English position on executory 
contracts.  The implication of the English position is that the debtor’s 
insolvency representative can disclaim, or reject, an uncompleted contract 
more or less as of right, unless the contract is specifically enforceable.  The 
United States position, as represented by Bankruptcy Code § 365, is at least 
superficially different because the provision makes rejection of contracts 
subject to court approval.  However, most courts apply a business judgment 
test, which means that the court will approve a proposed rejection unless it 
was made in bad faith or involved a breach of discretion, and so in practice 
the law is not so different from the English position.  Recent amendments to 
the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act143 and Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act144 confirm that Canadian law is to more or less the same 
effect. 
In England, the insolvency representative’s right of disclaimer will be 
defeated by the contract counterparty’s (A’s) claim for specific performance 
and, according to Calnan, a contract is specifically enforceable in 
insolvency proceedings if, and only if, A can establish a proprietary interest 
in the disputed asset.  It is commonly asserted that the availability of 
specific performance is itself the source of proprietary rights because 
equity, deeming as done what ought to be done, anticipates the decree.145  
However, if this were true, Calnan’s analysis would be circular.  Calnan 
argues, relying on Tailby v. Official Receiver,146 that the real basis for the 
recognition of equitable proprietary entitlements is "that equity will require 
a person who has made a promise to comply with it if it is given for good 
consideration."147  
But this explanation raises the further problem that "[i]t is not every 
case in which a person promises to create a proprietary interest over an 
identifiable asset that equity will step in and create an immediate equitable 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 § 65.1 (addressing the 
termination or amendment of agreements in bankruptcy). 
 144. See Companies’ Creditors Arrangement, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 § 32 (dealing with 
companies disclaiming agreements). 
 145. See, e.g., Holroyd v. Marshall, [1861–1862] 11 E.R. 191 (H.L.) 1005 ("In equity, 
the remedy for the assignee of the property would be more complete than at law, for specific 
performance might be decreed . . . ."). 
 146. See Tailby v. Official Receiver, [1888] L.R. 13 App. Cas. 523 (H.L.) 536 (holding 
that "[w]hen the consideration has been given, and the debt has been clearly identified as one 
of those in respect of which it was given, a Court of Equity will enforce the covenant of the 
parties . . . .") (Lord Watson). 
 147. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 5.56. 
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proprietary interest."148  For example, equity will intervene if the contract is 
one for the sale of land,149 but not if the contract is one for the sale of 
goods.150  Calnan’s explanation for the difference, relying in part on In re 
Wait,151 is that the rules for passing of property under a contract for the sale 
of goods are codified in the sale of goods legislation and the statute leaves 
no room for the transfer by sale of equitable entitlements.  He justifies the 
different rule for land sales on the ground that "the rule is settled" and 
suggests that in all other cases, "there is much to be said for the view that 
beneficial title should pass with legal title."152  The implication is that, if the 
slate were clean, there should be no exception for land sales either.153  
Calnan does not address the issue of specifically enforceable contracts for 
the sale of goods in bankruptcy (the case of the Van Gogh painting), but, by 
implication, the analysis is the same as for land sale contracts.  The 
Canadian approach to specific performance in bankruptcy is similar to the 
English position.154  
C.  Discussion 
To summarize, England and the United States share a common 
underlying agenda with regard to specific performance, which is to strike a 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. ¶ 5.59. 
 149. See Lysaght v. Edwards, [1875–1876] L.R. 2 Ch.D 499 (C.A.) 521–22 (holding 
that once a contract for the sale of land is signed, the vendor holds the property on 
constructive trust for the purchaser pending conveyance). 
 150. See In re Wait, [1927] 1 Ch. 606 (C.A.) 621–24 (holding that the sale of goods 
legislation prevents a buyer from claiming equitable title) (Lord Hanworth M.R.). 
 151. See id. at 624 (noting "that the transaction [at issue was] one of the most ordinary 
mercantile kind . . . not one of specific trust or appropriation of any particular funds."). 
 152. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 5.80. 
 153. Cf. Tanwar Enters. Pty Ltd. v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315, 337–38 (Austl.) 
(suggesting that the relationship between parties to an executory contract for the sale of land 
is a purely contractual one and not trustee-beneficiary). 
 154. See Armadale Properties Ltd. v. 700 King St. (1997) Ltd. (2001), 25 C.B.R. 4th 
198, para. 12 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (discussing specific performance).  In Semelhago v. 
Paramadevan, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada held that, to 
qualify for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, the plaintiff must prove 
affirmatively that the property has special features so that damages would be an inadequate 
remedy.  However, if, as Calnan suggests, the purchaser’s proprietary interest derives from 
the agreement itself and not from the availability of specific performance, the purchaser 
might still have a proprietary claim in the vendor’s bankruptcy even if the court were to deny 
specific performance on discretionary grounds.  For criticism of Semelhago, see Robert 
Chambers, The Importance of Specific Performance, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 431, 
434–48 (Simone Degeling & James Edelman eds., Sydney, Australia: Lawbook Co., 2005). 
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balance between the pari passu principle and the property of the estate 
principle.  The difference is that, as in other contexts, English law relies on 
formal distinctions to do the work, whereas the United States approach is 
more openly policy-based and more nuanced. 
VII.  Conclusion 
The status of proprietary remedies in bankruptcy is a difficult topic—
so difficult that, until not very long ago, it was hard even to discern the 
reasons for the difficulty, let alone to prescribe a solution to the problem.  
Thanks in substantial part to the Restatement in the United States, and to 
the recent contributions of scholars in England and other parts of the 
Commonwealth, we now do know the causes of the problem and we are 
well on the way to resolving it.  The source of the difficulty is that there are 
at least three inter-related sets of considerations in play.  The first is the 
distinction between personal and proprietary claims.  The second is the 
interplay between two fundamental bankruptcy law principles:  the pari 
passu  sharing principle and the property of the estate principle.  And the 
third is the tension between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy policy 
objectives. 
In common law systems, the distinction between personal and 
proprietary remedies is blurred by the intervention of equity.  Courts of 
equity, under the rubric of the maxim, "equity deems as done what ought to 
be done," invest certain personal claims with proprietary status, but the 
reasons for doing so are rarely articulated with any clarity.  In the case of 
long-established equitable interests, such as the trust and the equity of 
redemption, the logical infirmities which underpin them no longer matter, 
given the antiquity of the supporting case law.  These days, such interests 
are accepted without question, supported simply by the weight of authority.  
The same is not true, though, of more modern attempts to apply the maxim.  
Claims for the recognition of new proprietary interests are bound to be 
scrutinized on grounds of both logic and policy so that the underlying issues 
are forced out into the open.  To take the mistaken payment case as an 
example, at least in England and other parts of the Commonwealth where 
the case law is less settled than it is in the United States, the proprietary 
status of the payer’s claim cannot be supported simply on the basis of the 
equitable maxim.  It must also be explained why the maxim should apply 
and this, in turn, raises the other two sets of concerns identified above. 
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The property of the estate principle and the pari passu sharing 
principle are both part of all good bankruptcy law courses.  But they are 
typically taught as separate topics so that the inter-relationship between 
them may not be immediately obvious.  The property of the estate principle 
is inconsistent with the pari passu sharing principle because it provides a 
basis for giving certain unsecured creditors priority over others.  By the 
same token, the pari passu sharing principle is in tension with the property 
of the estate principle because a too rigorous insistence on equal 
distribution may defeat third party entitlements.  The challenge for the 
bankruptcy lawyer is to identify where the balance should be struck.  The 
answer cannot lie simply in an appeal to property rights as determined by 
non-bankruptcy law because, in the cases under consideration, the property 
rights are unsettled.  Inevitably, therefore, the question resolves into a 
policy one. 
At the policy level, there are competing bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy considerations at work.  The relevant bankruptcy considerations 
are:  (1) the requirement of equal treatment for creditors (pari passu); and 
(2) the importance of maximizing the size of the bankruptcy estate for the 
benefit of the creditors collectively.  In the mistaken payment and 
misrepresentation cases, the relevant non-bankruptcy objective is corrective 
justice for restitution claimants, while in the fiduciary cases it is deterrence 
of wrongdoing.  The challenge for the judge and the lawmaker is to identify 
these policy tensions and strike an appropriate trade-off.  As the discussion 
in this Article has shown, United States law, as represented in the 
Restatement, though sharing many common elements with the law in 
England and other parts of the Commonwealth, is also different in some 
important respects.  The existence of these differences should not really 
come as a surprise because the questions in issue all turn ultimately on 
policy trade-offs, and it is in the nature of a trade-off that reasonable minds 
might differ over the point at which it should be struck. 
  

